

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RABAT 01153 01 OF 02 272325Z

12

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 FEA-01 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01

CG-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DLOS-04 DOTE-00 EB-07

EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 INT-05 JUSE-00 NSF-01

OES-03 OMB-01 SAL-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EA-07 EUR-12 /148 W
----- 048590

R 271717Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7858

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 RABAT 1153

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, PFOR, US

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: DEPT.'S ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES AND
OBJECTIVES: REQUEST FOR MULTILATERAL INFORMATION ON HOST
GOVERNMENTS

REF: STATE 037591

1. INTRODUCTION: THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO DEPARTMENT'S
QUESTIONNAIRE CONTAINED REFTEL REGARDING MULTILATERAL POLICY-
MAKING AND OBJECTIVES OF MOROCCO AND HOW THEY RELATE TO U.S. AIMS
AND INTERESTS. WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO PREFACE OUR REPLY TO
THE REFTEL WITH SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MOROCCO WHICH SHOULD
BE KEPT IN MIND THROUGHOUT AND WILL ALLOW US TO AVOID REPEATING
OURSELVES IN ANSWERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. ADDITIONALLY, RABAT
1872 OF APRIL 17, 1975 IS STILL A VALID ANALYSIS OF THE MOROCCAN
APPROACH TO MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS.

--LOW KEY APPROACH. THE GOM IS NOT AMONGST THE MORE
OUTSPOKEN IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES. IT PREFERS IN GENERAL TO
CULTIVATE THE IMAGE OF A MODERATE, STATESMANLIKE APPROACH AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RABAT 01153 01 OF 02 272325Z

TO BENEFIT FROM THE FLEXIBILITY SUCH AN APPROACH CAN PRODUCE.

IT IS SENSITIVE TO BANDWAGONS BUT DOES NOT WISH TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN CONTROVERSY WHEN VITAL ISSUES ARE NOT INVOLVED. MOROCCO WILL BE MOST ACTIVE WHEN IT HOSTS OR CHAIRS MEETINGS. IT ENJOYS DOING THIS WHEN POSSIBLE IN ARAB AND AFRICAN AREAS BUT WILL USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BOLSTER ITS PRESTIGE RATHER THAN IMPOSE ITS VIEWS.

--THE KING. IT IS KING HASSAN WHO, ALMOST ALONE, DECIDES WHAT MOROCCO'S APPROACH ON ISSUES IMPORTANT TO IT WILL BE. HE IS ABOVE ALL A PRAGMATIST, NOT TAKEN WITH IDEOLOGY, AND IN FACT IS THE KIND OF INTERLOCUTOR ONE COULD DO BUSINESS WITH (BE SURE TO COUNT THE CHANGE) ON MATTERS WE SEE AS VITAL. SINCE DECISION MAKING IS SO LIMITED, HOWEVER, AND THE KING'S SUBORDINATES ARE APPARENTLY UNWILLING TO INVOLVE HIM IN MATTERS OF LESS THAN IMMEDIATE, DIRECT INTEREST, THE POSSIBILITY OF REAL INTERACTION IS MEASURABLY REDUCED.

--THE SAHARA. ALTHOUGH WE DESCEND TO THE PARTICULAR HERE, THE ISSUE IS OF IMMENSE LOCAL IMPORTANCE AND MAY WELL BE A POWERFUL DISTRACTION FROM OTHER MATTERS FOR SOME TIME TO COME. IT COULD ALSO BE A FACTOR INsofar AS MOROCCO MAY HAVE BUILT UP A DEBT OR A COMMITMENT TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SUPPORTED IT ON THE SAHARA IN THE UN, OAU, AND ARAB LEAGUE. CONVERSELY, THE KING HAS WARNED OTHER NATIONS--PARTICULARLY THE ARABS AND AFRICANS--THAT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING VIS-A-VIS MOROCCO COULD WELL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH IN FUTURE MEETINGS. MOST RECENTLY, MOROCCO HAS THREATENED TO WALK OUT OF THE OAU, TAKING OTHER MEMBERS WITH IT, IF THE BODY TURNS AGAINST IT ON THE SAHARA ISSUE.

--COMPLEX RELATIONS. MOROCCO IS LESS OF A HARD CORE BLOC MEMBER, AND LESS ALIGNED THAN MOST "NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES, BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY BROAD SPECTRUM OF CONSIDERATIONS WHICH DETERMINE ITS POLICY (SEE ABOVE CITED RABAT CABLE). IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THE GOM IS LIKELY TO REDEFINE THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS ON A CONTINUING BASIS WHENEVER AN ISSUE IS STRETCHED OUT OVER TIME. THIS MEANS THAT THE GOM'S VIEW OF ITS NATIONAL INTEREST IS NOT STATIC AND THAT WE SHOULD BE MONITORING AND ANALYZING THE DYNAMICS INVOLVED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. ANGOLA IS A CASE IN POINT. HAVING STARTED OUT WITH THE MODERATES, MOROCCO NEVERTHELESS DID NOT WISH TO BE THE LAST TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA AND THEREFORE PRECEDED MANY MODERATES IN THIS RESPECT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 RABAT 01153 01 OF 02 272325Z

--ALGERIA. GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, ALGERIA MAY BECOME AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON MOROCCO'S BEHAVIOR TO THE EXTENT THAT IT MAY FORCE MOROCCO TO DEFEND ITSELF IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. ALTHOUGH ITS SHAPE IS NOT YET CLEAR, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN INTERPLAY WILL BE A FACTOR OUR OBSERVERS AND REPS WILL NEED TO MONITOR IN INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND MOROCCAN BEHAVIOR.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS POSED BY REFTEL: (PARA 7A REFTEL) MOROCCO'S PRIMARY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN 1976 WILL BE ABOUT EVENLY DIVIDED BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. WE HAVE SEEN NO REPORTING FROM THE DEPARTMENT OR MULTILATERAL BODIES, AND HAVE LITTLE LOCALLY AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, TO INDICATE THAT MOROCCO WILL CONCERN ITSELF ACTIVELY WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN THOSE BELOW.

3. SAHARA. THE OVERRIDING ISSUE. THE QUESTION MAY COME UP IN THE UN, ARAB LEAGUE, OAU, ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OR NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE AND IS POTENTIALLY HIGHLY DIVISIVE. MOROCCO CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO ANY ATTEMPT TO QUESTION THE LEGALITY OF ITS OCCUPATION OF THE SAHARA. IT WILL PROBABLY BE WORKING HARD, PERHAPS AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS ATTENTION TO OTHER ISSUES, TO SECURE AS MUCH INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL, OR AT LEAST ACQUIESCENCE, AS POSSIBLE.

4. MIDDLE EAST. THE SECOND OF THE TWO PRIMARY AREAS OF INTEREST. MOROCCO SEES NEED FOR AN ENDURING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AND FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF ARAB UNITY AND FOR BOTH REASONS HAS SOUGHT TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE AMONGST THE ARABS. WHILE OFTEN SUPPORTIVE OF US DIPLOMACY, MOROCCO WILL NOT SOON FORGET THE VALUE OF ITS 1973 CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARAB WAR EFFORT AND WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THE MAINSTREAM ARAB LINE IN VOTING IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS.

5. LOS. AS AN ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN STATE DOMINATING THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR FROM THE SOUTH, MOROCCO SEES LOS CONFERENCE AS AN AREA OF PRIMARY INTEREST. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE STILL SEEMS TO BE OBTAINING CONFERENCE SUPPORT FOR INNOCENT PASSAGE DOCTRINE, FOR MUCH THE SAME REASONS DISCUSSED IN RABAT 1671, 5 APRIL 1975. TONE OF ITS APPROACH LIKELY TO CHANGE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 RABAT 01153 01 OF 02 272325Z

SOMEWHAT, HOWEVER. ALGERIA HAS RECENTLY REPLACED SPAIN AS THE GOM'S PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES AND THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME GOM-GOS AGREEMENT TO RELEGATE CEUTA AND MELILLA ENCLAVES PROBLEM TO THE FUTURE. THERE IS NOW A GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT SPAIN AND MOROCCO WILL CLOSELY COORDINATE THEIR ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE STRAITS ISSUE. EVEN SHOULD THIS NOT HAPPEN, HOWEVER, THE MOROCCAN POSITION MAY STIFFEN ANYWAY SHOULD GOM PERCEIVE A NEED TO TRY TO EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE OVER ALGERIAN MOVEMENT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

6. MOROCCO ALSO HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN OTHER LOS ISSUES OF FISHERIES, ECONOMIC ZONE, DEEP SEABEDS AND MARINE POLLUTION. USG-GOM POSITIONS SEEM TO BE MUCH CLOSER IN THESE AREAS, HOWEVER, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MOROCCO'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR A DOUBLE STANDARD ON MARINE POLLUTION IN GENERAL.

7. ENERGY. MOROCCO HEAVILY IMPACTED BY OPEC PRICE INCREASES, BUT AS ARAB STATE ITS POSITION IS AMBIVALENT. IT REQUIRES SUPPORT OF ARAB BROTHERS ON MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE OF SAHARA AND THIS MAY BE PART OF THE REASON IT HAS PRESERVED LOW PROFILE IN DISCUSSING PETROLEUM QUESTION. SAUDI ARABIA CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE ESPECIALLY INFLUENTIAL WITH MOROCCO ON PETROLEUM. GOM NEVERTHELESS TRIED TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT FOR PREFERENTIAL OPEC PRICING TO NON-OIL LDC'S BY ITS POLICY OF EXTENDING LONG-TERM PREFERENTIAL CREDITS FOR ITS OWN SALES OF PHOSPHATES TO LDC'S. GOM BELIEVED TO SUPPORT CONCEPT OF SUPPORT PRICE FOR PETROLEUM IN ORDER TO ASSURE ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF ITS ACTIVE MEASURES TO EXPLOIT LOCAL OIL SHALES. BOTH SEMI-OFFICIAL AND OPPOSITION PRESS HAVE WELCOMED RECENT BREACH IN OPEC PRICE FRONT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 RABAT 01153 02 OF 02 280928Z

12

ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AF-06

ARA-06 EA-07 EUR-12 NEA-10 FEA-01 ACDA-05 AGR-05

AID-05 CEA-01 CEQ-01 CG-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00

DLOS-04 DOTE-00 EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00

INT-05 JUSE-00 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01 SAL-01 /148 W

----- 056520

R 271717Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7859

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 RABAT 1153

8. RAW MATERIALS. GOM HAS UNSUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT GROUP OF 77 SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION PHOSPHATE ROCK AMONG RAW MATERIALS FOR WHICH AGREED MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS BEING CONSIDERED. MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO SEVERAL TIMES SIGNALLED THIS INTEREST TO US EMBASSY CONTACTS. WITH PHOSPHATE ROCK SALES AND PRICES OFF DRAMATICALLY, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT GOM WILL CONTINUE

TO SEARCH FOR MEANS TO RATIONALIZE WORLD PHOSPHATE ROCK PRODUCTION AND SALES.

9. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM. MOROCCO, OR AT LEAST PRESENT FINMIN, HAS EXPRESSED PUBLIC UNHAPPINESS OVER IMF REFORM LEGITIMIZING FLOATING RATES. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT MOROCCO CAN DO ABOUT THE SITUATION, BUT FINMIN BENSLIMANE IS INFLUENTIAL IN THE IRAN GROUP (WHICH HE REPRESENTS ON THE RAW MATERIALS SUB-COMMITTEE) AND COULD CONCEIVABLY LOBBY AGAINST RATIFICATION OF THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORD.

10. (7B.) THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE ARAB LEAGUE, OAU, NAC AND, TO SOME EXTENT, THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAVE HAD MEASURABLE INFLUENCE ON MOROCCAN POLICY, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RABAT 01153 02 OF 02 280928Z

MIDDLE EAST, ANY "DECOLONIZATION" ISSUE (GUAM, PUERTO RICO), KOREA AND, IN THE LARGER SENSE, ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN GENERAL. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE ON NUMEROUS QUESTIONS OF MARGINAL INTEREST TO MOROCCO, WHERE GOM HAS FEW STRONG VIEWS, PREFERRING TO BE PART OF ACQUIESCENT MAJORITY. EVEN ON FRONT LINE ISSUE OF SAHARA, GOM HAS BEEN SENSITIVE TO VIEWS PARTICULARLY OF ARAB LEAGUE AND OAU AS INDICATED BY ENERGY WITH WHICH IT HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ITS CASE IN THOSE CIRCLES.

11. GROUP 77/IRAN IMF GROUP. GOM MINCOM AND MINFIN ARE ACTIVE IN THESE TWO GROUPS AND, WE BELIEVE, HAVE SOME INFLUENCE. GOM POSITIONS HAVE IN GENERAL BEEN MODERATE, WITHOUT DEPARTING NOTABLY FROM CONSENSUS VIEW.

12 THE U.S. AND USSR ARE BOTH COUNTRIES OF INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCE ON MOROCCO. THIS INFLUENCE, HOWEVER, TENDS TO COME INTO PLAY IN TERMS OF THE GOM'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AN EAST-WEST BALANCE IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY RATHER THAN ON AD HOC BASIS.

13. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT SEEM TO HAVE SOLID CLOUT WITH THE GOM, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE SAHARA AND MIDDLE EAST, ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS MAY HAVE LOST SOME INFLUENCE ON THE LATTER ISSUE SINCE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF DISENCHANTMENT OF VARIOUS ARAB GOVERNMENTS WITH SINAI II. JORDAN MAY BE OF SOME INFLUENCE ACROSS THE BOARD BECAUSE OF KING HASSAN'S FRIENDSHIP AND STEADY CONTACT WITH HUSSEIN. TUNISIA AND MOROCCO INCREASINGLY SEE THEMSELVES AS HAVING COMMON CAUSE IN THE MAGHREB.

14. FRANCE IS ALSO GENERALLY INFLUENTIAL WITH MOROCCO, ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WITH PRECISION EXACTLY TO WHAT DEGREE. WE WOULD EXPECT PARIS TO HAVE ITS GREATEST IMPACT ON ARAB-EUROPEAN ISSUES, ON MAGHREB QUESTIONS AND IN THE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE. SPAIN'S POTENTIALLY SUBSTANTIAL

INFLUENCE WILL DEPEND ON THE DURABILITY OF THEIR MOROCCAN-SPANISH ENTENTE ON THE SAHARA, WHICH ALSO ENTAILS MOROCCAN QUIESCENCE ON THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES ISSUE.

15. (7C.) THE GOM APPARENTLY FURNISHES ITS REPRESENTATIVES WITH COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS ON MATTERS OF CRUCIAL INTEREST TO IT, AND SEEMS ABLE TO EXERCISE CONTROL WHEN IT WANTS TO. WE HAVE THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 RABAT 01153 02 OF 02 280928Z

IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS MUCH LESS TRUE IN THE CASE OF POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC ISSUES IT SEES AS MARGINAL, ON WHICH ITS REPS HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO FOLLOW THEIR OWN INSTINCTS. THE GOM UN COMMITTEE VOTE AGAINST THE US LAST YEAR ON THE GUAM RESOLUTION IS A PERTINENT EXAMPLE. LOS POLICY, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF STRAITS, SEEMS TO BE MADE AND EXECUTED BY THE GOM'S REPRESENTATIVES WITH LITTLE INTERFERENCE.

16. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE INDICATIONS, INTENSITY OF GOM PREPARATIONS FOR PRELIMINARY RAW MATERIALS CONFERENCE IN PARIS, INVOLVING SEVERAL MINISTRIES AND REACHING DOWN TO WORKING LEVEL. IN OTHER CASES (E.G. IMF MEETINGS), DECISIONS ARE MADE BY APPROPRIATE MINISTERS (IN CASE OF IMF MEETINGS, MINFIN AND CENTRAL BANK VICE GOVERNOR) AND THEIR TECHNICAL CABINETS.

17. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE THE QUALITY OF GOM DELEGATES' REPORTING. WE WOULD GUESS IT IS SKETCHY ON LOW-PRIORITY MATTERS.

18. (7D.) NO. CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS A ROYAL BAILIWICK FROM WHICH INDIVIDUALS OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL INFLUENCE ARE SYSTEMATICALLY EXCLUDED. ADDITIONALLY, SENIOR REPS ARE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHMENT TYPES WHOSE FORTUNES ARE THOROUGHLY DEPENDENT ON ROYAL FAVOR.

19. (7E.) THE GOM IS RECEPTIVE TO REPRESENTATIONS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LOS) IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS WILLING TO HEAR US POSITIONS IN DETAIL AND TO BRING THEM TO THE ATTENTION OF THE APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AUTHORITY, HOWEVER, IS SO NARROWLY LIMITED THAT RECIPIENTS OF OUR PRESENTATIONS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS FORCED TO BE NON-COMMITTAL ON THE MERITS OF OUR CASE OR UNABLE TO GIVE US A TRUE PICTURE OF GOM VIEWS. ADDITIONALLY, WE RECEIVE LITTLE OR NO FEEDBACK ON MOST OF OUR DEMARCHES AND CAN ONLY JUDGE THEIR EFFECT FAR DOWNSTREAM WHEN VOTES ARE ACTUALLY CAST.

20. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE GOM HAS VISCERALLY ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR MUTUAL INTERACTION ON ANY BUT THOSE ISSUES WHICH WE CAN REASONABLY PURSUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE HAVE LITTLE INDICATIONS THAT GOM FULLY APPRECIATES THAT LACK OF FORTHCOMINGNESS IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN INDEED IMPACT ADVERSELY ON OUR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 RABAT 01153 02 OF 02 280928Z

RELATIONS. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT IT IS EASIER FOR
GOM TO RECOGNIZE IMPACT OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS (E.G. UNRESOLVED
PROPERTY SEIZURES) ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES (POTENTIAL WITHHOLDING
OF US VOTE ON IBRD LOANS) AND VICE VERSA.

21. THE GOM HAS ONLY SELDOM USED THE EMBASSY TO REINFORCE ITS
DIPLOMACY ELSEWHERE AND SEEMS RELATIVELY RARELY TO CONSIDER THIS
A USEFUL CHANNEL FOR DIALOGUE ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS OR GENERAL
POINTS OF VIEW, ALTHOUGH THIS PHENOMENON IS LESS TRUE OF ECONOMIC
THAN POLITICAL ISSUES.
NEUMANN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976RABAT01153
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760075-1191
From: RABAT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t1976025/aaaaadkm.tel
Line Count: 348
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 STATE 37591
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 APR 2004 by greeneet>; APPROVED <11 AUG 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: DEPT.'S ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES: REQUEST FOR MULTILATERAL INFORMATION
ON HOST
TAGS: PORG, PFOR, US, MO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006